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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes some variants of Temporal Defeasible Logic
(TDL) to reason about normative modifications. These variants
make it possible to differentiate cases in which, for example, mod-
ifications at some time change legal rules but their conclusions per-
sist afterwards from cases where also their conclusions are blocked.
1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
This paper presents some variants of Temporal Defeasible Logic
(TDL) [5, 4] to reason about different aspects of norm modifica-
tions. The issues discussed in this paper are similar to those as-
sumed in [5], namely: (1) to reason about conditional modifica-
tions of conditional normative provisions, where the former ones
apply under, and are conditioned to, the occurrence of some uncer-
tain events; (2) to identify criteria for detecting and solving con-
flicts between textual modifications; (3) to clarify the specific role
played by the temporal dimension in modelling norm modification
processes. The novelty of this work is that we are interested in
defining different temporal constraints according to which the ele-
ments of a normative system, and the conclusions that follow from
them, can, or cannot persist over time. Indeed, several options are
available, and each of them corresponds to a specific way through
which norm modifications can take place and behave.
Norm applications and modifications take place along the axis of
time. In particular, a rule is represented at least as (at ⇒ bt ′) : t ′′,
where instants t and t ′ indicate the time at which a and b hold, while
t ′′ is the time when the rule is in force. A temporal model should
allow us to give an accurate account of the dynamics of norms
and therefore to manage legal modifications consistently with le-
gal principles [10].
A legal system is defined as a set of documents fixed at a time t
and which have been issued by an authority and whose validity de-
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pends on rules that determine, for any given time, whether a single
document belongs to the system. Formally:
LS(t) = D1(t),D2(t),D3(t), . . . ,Dm(t)
where m ∈ N, Di denotes documents and t is a fixed time in a dis-
crete representation. A normative system, in turn, takes the doc-
uments belonging to a legal system and organises them to reflect
their evolution over time. A normative system should therefore
be defined as a particular discrete time-series of legal systems that
evolves over time. In formal terms:
NS = LS(t1),LS(t2),LS(t3), . . . ,LS(t j), j ∈ N.
The passage from a legal system to another legal system is ef-
fected either by normative modifications or by simple persistence.
However, norm-modifying provisions, too, belong to legal systems,
and, as other legal provisions, they can be seen as conditional state-
ments. Accordingly, also modifications have three temporal dimen-
sions, these being attached to the conditions, to the effects, and to
the overall conditional. These temporal dimensions refer to the effi-
cacy, applicability, and force of the provision, respectively. Further-
more, one has to consider the time of observability of the normative
system. Consider a law r of 2001 nullified in 2005: the change af-
fects the entire normative system because the legal text is removed
from the system as if it had never been there in the first place (ex-
tunc removal). The same would happen, e.g., with a temporary law
decree that does not pass into law or with a retroactive abrogation
[7]. The peculiarity of system changes shows up when we query
the system to retrieve information from it: if today (e.g., 2007) we
ask for all the laws in force in 2001, law r will not turn up and the
system will look as if that law had never been in force in the first
place. But if we enter the query as if we were in 2001, when the an-
nulment had not yet occurred, law r will show up as being in force,
and the entire system will reflect that fact. This difference depends
on the temporal point of view from which we query the system and
this refers to the time of observability of a normative system.
It is possible to identify different kinds of normative conditional
in a temporal setting, and so different ways of how normative mod-
ifications temporally affect the normative system [6, 5]. For ex-
ample, we can distinguish between persistent and transient rules:
the former, if applicable, permit to infer literals that persist unless
some other, subsequent, and incompatible events or states of affairs
terminate them; the latter allow for the inference of literals which
hold on the condition and only while the antecedents of these rules
hold. But these characterisation of transiency and persistency pro-
vides only a partial picture of how things can or cannot evolve over
time. Persistency is a notion which need to be linked with a specific
temporal perspective. Consider the following legal provisions
r1 : (a10⇒ b10) : 10 r2 : (b10⇒ c10) : 10
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Both r1 and r2 are assumed to produce persistent conclusions,
namely, that b and c persist after 10 if r1 and r2 are applicable
at 10. Now suppose that a modification m at time 20 applies to
r1, holding 10, and nullifies it. This is a case of retroactive mod-
ification, as the norm-modifying provision m is in force at 20. If
we obtain a at 10, this makes r2 applicable, thus deriving c at 10
and afterwards. So, despite, the annulment of r1, its legal effects
are propagated. A simple solution to obviate the problem is to state
that the conclusion of r1 can be propagated after a certain time only
if r1 has not been in the meantime nullified. This is not enough, as
this would simply block b from 20 afterwards, but it would not ap-
ply to c, which was derived at 10: c will hold after 20 independently
of m. Of course, we can imagine scenarios in which the applicabil-
ity of r1 may support a large number of rule chains, thus posing a
serious computational problem. Indeed, this is a concrete difficulty
which arises when we aim to model ex-tunc modifications which
are meant to cancel all legal effects of a certain legal provision.
But things are even more complex. In fact, persistency and tran-
siency can apply not only to conclusions of rules, but also to the
rules themselves, to the time of observability, and also to deriva-
tions (i.e., queries). This gives rise to several options regarding
how modifications affect the legal system over time. We will con-
sider the interplay among different time-lines; in particular, among
the time-lines through which conclusions, derivations, and rules
persist either within a certain version of the legal system or across
different temporal versions of the legal system.
We will also distinguish between modifiable and non-modifiable
rules. Non-modifiable normative provisions are important when
constitutions are considered. In fact, in many legal systems some
parts of the constitution cannot be changed even by the special pro-
cedures the constitution sets forth for its revision.
2. TEMPORAL DEFEASIBLE LOGIC
Defeasible Logic (DL) [9, 1] is a simple, efficient (indeed the
complexity is linear [8]) but flexible non-monotonic formalism ca-
pable of dealing with many different intuitions of non-monotonic
reasoning with a logic programing like language. DL is charac-
terised by an argumentation semantics [3] and also has several ef-
ficient implementations [2]. Temporal Defeasible Logic (TDL) is
an umbrella expression to designate extensions of DL to capture
time. TDL has proved useful in modelling temporal aspects of nor-
mative reasoning, such as temporalised normative positions [6]; in
addition, the notion of a temporal viewpoint –the temporal position
from which things are viewed– allows for a logical account of norm
modifications and retroactive rules [5]. Here we present some vari-
ants that deal with temporal dimensions as exposed in Section 1.
Temporal aspects are integrated by two means: first by introducing
temporal coordinates and second normative modifications.
[6] extended DL with temporalised literals, i.e., every literal in
the logic has associated to it a timestamp. Thus we have expres-
sions of the type a : t, meaning that a holds at time t. This means
that we have to give the condition to prove a literal at time t. So
we have to consider whether a conclusion is transient (holding at
precisely one instant or time) or whether it is persistent. To prove
that a holds at t, we can prove that a held at a previous instant t ′ and
then for all instant in between t and t ′, it is not possible to terminate
a. We will refer to this property as persistence of a conclusion.
As we have argued above not only literals (propositions) have
their temporal validity, but this is true for the other components
of our knowledge: we can speak of the time of force of a rule,
i.e., the time when a rule can be used to derive a conclusion given
a set premises. In this perspective we can have expressions like
r : (ata → btb) : tr, meaning that the rule r is in force at time tr, or
in other words, we can use the rule to derive the conclusion at time
tr. The full semantics of this expression is that at time tr we can
derive that b holds at time tb if we can prove that a holds at time ta.
But now we are doing a derivation at time tr, so the conclusion btb
is derived at time tr and the premise ata must be derived at time tr
as well. In the same way a conclusion can persist, and we can have
the same for rules and then for derivations.
What we derive depends on what rules are valid, and on the nor-
mative content of rules, at the time when we do the derivation. In
addition, we have to consider the case that the content of a rule can
be changed. Thus we have to devise a mechanism to capture this
phenomenon. To this end we introduce meta-rules, i.e., rules where
the consequent is itself a rule and not only a simple proposition. In
addition to keep track of the changes to a norm, i.e., to represent a
normative systems as defined in Section 1, we introduce the notion
of a repository, i.e., a snap-shot of rules and literals known to exist
at a specific time instant. In the rest of the section we will give a
formal presentation of the notions discussed so far.
The language of TDL is based on a (numerable) set of atomic
proposition Prop = {p,q, . . .}, a set of rule labels {r1,r2, . . .}, a
discrete totally ordered set of instants of time T = {t1, t2, . . .}, and
the negation sign ¬. A plain literal is either an atomic proposition
or the negation of it. Given a literal l with ∼l we denote the com-
plement of l, that is, if l is a positive literal p then ∼l = ¬p, and if
l = ¬p then ∼l = p. If l is a literal and t is an instant of time, i.e.,
t ∈T , the lt is a temporal literal. The meaning of a temporal literal
lt is that l holds at time t.
Knowledge in DL can be represented in two ways: facts and
rules. Facts are indisputable statements, represented either in form
of states of affairs and actions that have been performed (literals).
For example, “John is a minor in year 2007”. In the logic, this
might be expressed as Minor(John)2007. A rule is a relation be-
tween a set of of premises and a conclusion, where the admissible
conclusions are either literals or rules themselves, and the conclu-
sions and the premises will be qualified with the time when they
hold. We consider two classes of rules: meta-rules and proper
rules. Meta-rules describe the inference mechanism of the insti-
tution on which norms are formalised and can be used to establish
conditions for the creation and modification of other rules or norms,
while proper rules corresponds to norms in a normative systems.
Rules can also be partitioned according to their strength into strict
rules (denoted by →), defeasible rules (denoted by ⇒) and de-
featers (denoted by;). Strict rules are rules in the classical sense:
they are monotonic and whenever the premises are indisputable so
is the conclusion. Defeasible rules, on the other hand, are non-
monotonic: they can be defeated by contrary evidence. Finally
defeaters are the weakest rules: they do not support conclusions,
but can be used to block the derivation of opposite conclusions.
We define the set of rules as follows: a rule is either a meta-rule
or a proper rule or the empty rule ⊥, where
• If r is a proper rule then ∼r is a rule.
• If r is a rule and t ∈T , then r : t is a temporalised rule.
• If r is a temporalised rule and t ∈ T , then r@t is a tempo-
ralised rule with viewpoint.
• Let A be a finite set of temporal literals, C be a temporal literal
and r a temporalised rule, then A ↪→ C is a rule, and A ↪→ r
and A ↪→∼r are meta-rules (henceforth we use ↪→ as a meta-
variable for either→ when the rule is a strict rule,⇒ when the
rule is a defeasible rule, and; when the rule is a defeater).
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs,
the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd , the set of strict and defeasible
rules in R by Rsd , and the set of defeaters in R by Rd f t . R[q] denotes
the set of rules in R with consequent q. A(r) denotes the antecedent
or body of r and C(r) the head or consequent of r.
Norms in a normative system have two temporal dimensions:
when the norm is in force in it, and when the norm exists in the nor-
mative system from a certain viewpoint. Temporalised rules cap-
ture only one dimension, the time of force. For the other dimension
we introduce the notion of temporalised rule with viewpoint. A
temporalised rule with viewpoint is a functionT 7→ (T 7→Rules).
The above inductive definition makes it possible to have nested
rules. For example, the following is a meta-rule with viewpoint:
((ptp ,qtq ⇒ (ptp ⇒ sts) : tv)) : t ′v@tr (1)
(1) exists from viewpoint tr, is in force from t ′v and means that if p
is true at tp and q at tq, then the rule ptp ⇒ sts is in force at tr.
A normative system NS is a sequence of legal systems LS (see
Section 1). The temporal viewpoint corresponds to a legal system
while the temporal dimension temporalising a rule corresponds to
the time-line inside a legal system. Thus the meaning of an expres-
sion r : tv@tr is that we take the value of the temporalised rule r : tv
in the legal systems LS(tr). Accordingly, a legal system is just a
repository (set) of norms (implemented as temporal functions).
We extend the notion of viewpoint to temporalised literals: if lt
is a temporal literal and t ′ ∈ T , then lt@t ′ is a fully temporalised
literal. The meaning of lt@t ′ is that it is possible to use the infor-
mation that l holds at t from time t ′, i.e. that the information in
available in the repository corresponding to time t ′.
Finally, for every literal and rule and every temporal dimension
we have to specify whether the element is persistent or transient for
that temporal dimension. The interpretation of transient and persis-
tent elements is as follows: A transient temporalised literal lt,trans,
means that l holds at time t, while a persistent temporal literal lt,pers
signals that l holds for all instants of time after t (t included), for
the time-line of the legal system in which the literal is found. For a
transient fully temporalised literal lt@(t ′, trans) the reading is that
the validity of l at t is specific to the legal system corresponding
to repository associated to t ′, while lt@(t ′, pers) indicates that the
validity of l at t is preserved when we move to legal systems after
the legal system identified by t ′. An expression r : (t, trans) sets the
value of r at time t and just at that time, while r : (t, pers) sets the
values of r to a particular instance for all time after t (t included).
These two notions refer to the time-line of a specific legal system,
and a similar reading can be given for persistence for the time-line
of the normative system1.
A normative system is represented by a temporalised defeasible
theory, which is a structure
(T ,F,Rnm,Rmeta,Rmod,≺)
whereT is a totally ordered discrete set of time points, F is a finite
set of facts, where a fact is a fully temporalised literals, Rnm is a
finite set of unmodifiable rules, Rmeta is a finite set of meta rules,
Rmod is a finite set of proper rules, and ≺, the superiority relation
over rules is formally defined as T 7→ (T 7→ Rules×Rules).
The superiority relation ≺ determines the relative strength for
rules for every instant in every legal systems. Thus it is possible
that a rule r is both stronger and weaker than another rule s in a
legal system, and then that two rules in different legal systems in a
normative system have opposite relative strengths.
We are now ready to define how conclusions can be obtained in
TDL. Notice that every time we have to use a rule, we have to en-
sure that the rule is derivable from the theory. Proof conditions for
1To simplify the presentation we specify if an element is persistent
or transient only when relevant.
rules are slightly different from those for literals (though they fol-
low the same intuition). Accordingly, we will give separate proof
conditions for deriving literals and for deriving rules. In addition
we have to extend the notion of complement to cover rules. Here,
we use again the intuition that a rule is a function. Given a rule
instance r : A(r) ↪→ b : t,
R[∼r : t] = {r :⊥ : t}∪{r : A′(r) ↪→ b′ : t|A′(r) 6= A(r) or b′ 6= b}
The main notion at hand is the notion of derivation (or proof).
A proof P is a finite sequence of tagged expressions such that:
(1) Each expression is either a temporalised rule or a tempo-
ralised literal; (2) Each tag is one the following: +∆t@t ′, −∆t@t ′,
+∂ t@t ′, −∂ t@t ′; (3) The proof conditions strict rule provability,
defeasible rule provability, strict literal provability and defeasible
literal provability given below are satisfied by the sequence P.
Given a proof P we use P(n) to denote the n-th element of the
sequence, and P[1..n] denotes the first n elements of P.
A proof tag has four components: (1) sign, (2) tag, (3) derivation
time and (4) repository time. Accordingly, the meaning of the proof
tags is a follows:
• ±∆t@t ′ xtx (resp. ±∆t@t ′ r : tr) meaning that we have (we do
not have) a definite derivation of xtx (resp. r : tv) at time t using
the elements in the repository at time t ′;
• ±∂ t@t ′ xtx (resp. ±∂ t@t ′ r : tr) meaning that we have (we do
not have) a defeasible derivation of xtx (resp. r : tv) at time t
using the elements in the repository at time t ′.
We will adopt in the proof conditions the following convention for
the various times involved: td is the time with respect to which we
do the derivation and it refers to the time-line within a legal system,
tr is the repository time, thus it is the time-line of the normative sys-
tem. Finally, the last temporal dimension is the object time, which
for a rule is the time of force tv, for a literal a it is the time when the
literal holds; we use ata for a temporal literal. The derivation and
the repository times are parameters of the proof tags.
The mechanism for a derivation in the framework is as follows.
A derivation corresponds to a query, and the query is parametrised
by two temporal values: the repository time and the derivation time.
The repository time is used to time-slice the information relevant
for the query using the time-line of the normative system. This
means that we retrieve all elements of the theory where the repos-
itory time is equal to the repository time of the query and all ele-
ments whose repository time is less than the repository time of the
query but the elements carry over due to persistence over repos-
itories. After this step we have the legal system in force at the
repository time. At this stage the derivation time kicks in. Simi-
larly to what we have done in the previous step, we use the value of
the derivation time to time-slice the legal system under analysis. In
particular we consider all rules whose time of force is equal to the
derivation time, or rules whose time of force precedes the current
derivation time but carries over to it because such rules are marked
as persistent. Finally, we consider the temporalised literals in the
rules resulting from the previous steps, and we check if the literals
are provable with the time with which they appear in the rules.
Strict Rule Provability
If P(n+1) = +∆td@tr r : tv then
1) r : t ′v@t ′r ∈ Rnm or
2) ∃s@t ′r ∈ Rmetas : ∀ata ∈ A(s),+∆td@tr ata ∈ P[1..n], or
3) +∆t ′d@t
′′
r r : t
′
v.
where: (1) if r is persistent, then t ′v ≤ tv; (2) if r is transient, then
tv = t ′v; (3) if facts, rules and meta-rules are persistent across repos-
itories, then t ′r < tr, otherwise t ′r = tr; (4) t ′d < td if conclusions are
persistent within a repository; (5) t ′′r < tr if conclusions are persis-
tent across repositories.
Notice that for clause (2) we must be able to prove the antecedent
of the meta-rule s with exactly the same reference point, i.e., com-
bination of derivation time td and repository time tr as the reference
point of the conclusion we prove, i.e., r : tv; whether the literals used
to apply s are obtained by persistency or by a direct derivation with
the appropriate time reference depends on the proof conditions for
literals and the variant of temporal defeasible logic at hand. Finally
clause (3) is the persistence clause for strict derivation of rules.
Defeasible Rule Provability
If P(n+1) = +∂ td@tr r : tv, then
1) +∆td@tr r : tv or
2) −∆td@tr ∼r : tv and
2.1a) r : t ′v@t ′r ∈ Rmod or
2.1b) ∃s : ts ∈ Rmetasd [r : t ′v] : ∀ata ∈ A(s),+∂ t ′d@t ′′r ata ∈ P[1..n] and
2.2) ∀m : tm ∈ R[∼r : tv] either
.1) ∃b : tb ∈ A(m) :−∂ t ′′d @t ′′′r btb ∈ P[1..n] or
.2) m : tm ≺trtd r : tr, if 2.1a obtains or
.3) m : tm ≺trtd s : ts, if 2.1b obtains or
.4) ∃w : tw ∈ R[r : t ′′v ] : ∀ctc ∈ A(w),+∂ t ′′′d @t ′′′′r ctc ∈ P[1..n] and
m : tm ≺trtd w : tw
where (1) if r is persistent, then t ′v ≤ tv; (2) if r is transient, then
tv = t ′v; (3) if ata , (resp. btb , ctc ) is persistent within the repository
at tr, then t ′d ≤ td (resp. t ′′d ≤ td , t ′′′d ≤ td); (4) if ata (resp. btb , ctc )
is transient within the repository at tr, then t ′d = td) (resp. t
′′
d = td ,
t ′′′d = td); (5) if a
ta ’s, btb ’s and ctc ’s are persistent with respect to
repositories (i.e., conclusions are persistent), then t ′′r , t ′′′r , t ′′′′r ≤ tr;
(6) if r : t ′v and s (i.e., facts, rules, and meta-rules) are persistent
with respect to repositories, then t ′r ≤ tr.
Strict Literal Provability
If P(n+1) = +∆td@tr ptp , then
1) pt
′
p @t ′r ∈ F ; or
2) ∃r : tv ∈ Rs[pt ′p ] such that
.1) +∆td@tr r : t ′v ∈ P[1..n], where t ′v = td and




t ′p ∈ P[1..n].
where: (1) if p is persistent, then t ′p ≤ tp; (2) if p is transient, then
t ′p = tp; (3) if r is persistent, then t ′v ≤ tv; (4) if r is transient, then
tv = t ′v; (5) if facts, rules and meta-rules are persistent across reposi-
tories, then t ′r < tr, otherwise t ′r = tr; (6) if conclusions are persistent
within a repository, thent ′d < td ; (7) if conclusions are persistent
across repositories, thent ′r < tr .
Defeasible Literal Provability
If P(n+1) = +∂ td@tr ptp , then
1) +∆td@tr ptp ∈ P[1..n] or
2) −∆td@tr ∼ptp ∈ P[1..n] and
2.1) ∃r : tv ∈ Rsd [pt
′
p ] such that
+∂ t ′d@t
′
r r : t
′
v ∈ P[1..n] and
∀ata ∈ A(r),+∂ t ′d@t ′r ata ∈ P[1..n], and
2.2) ∀s : ts ∈ R[∼pt∼p ] if +∂ t ′′d @t ′′r s : t ′s ∈ P[1..n], then either
.1) ∃btb ∈ A(s),−∂ t ′′d @t ′′r btb ∈ P[1..n] or
.2) ∃w : tw ∈ R[p : t ′′p ] such that
+∂ t ′′d @t
′′
r w : tw ∈ P[1..n] and
∀ctc ∈ A(w),+∂ t ′′d @t ′′r ctc ∈ P[1..n] and s : ts ≺trtd w : tw.
where (1) if p is persistent, t ′p ≤ t∼p ≤ tp, otherwise t ′p = t∼p =
tp; (2) t ′s ≤ tv, if s is persistent, otherwise ts = t ′s = tv; (3) td ≤
t ′s, if s is persistent, otherwise ts = t ′s = td ; (4) if conclusions are
persistent over derivations (i.e., +∂ t ′d@tr p
pt implies +∂ td@tr ppt
where t ′d < td), then, t
′
d ≤ t ′′d ≤ td ; (5) if conclusions are persistent
over repositories, then t ′r ≤ t ′′r ≤ tr.
The above proof conditions produce classes of TDLs, according
to the conditions on the temporal parameters. In particular it is pos-
sible to define variants capturing different types of persistence. For
our purpose we mention rule and causal conclusion persistence.
Generally once a norm has been introduced in a normative sys-
tem, or better in a specific legal system of the normative system, the
norm continues to be in the normative system unless it is explicitly
removed (see Section 3 for some possible types of removal). This
means that the norm must be included in all legal systems succeed-
ing the legal system in which it has been first introduced. This
effect is achieved by specifying that the derivation of rules is per-
sistent over repositories.
If we can prove a conclusion with respect to a specific legal sys-
tem in some cases we have to propagate it to successive legal sys-
tems. In particular this is the case when we have causal conclu-
sions. This was the option we explored in [5]. However, for some
type of norm modifications, namely annulment (see Section 3), we
have to block the persistence of conclusions over repositories when
the reasons for deriving a conclusion are no longer in the legal sys-
tem. This effect depends on whether derivations of conclusions are
persistent over repositories, and it is in function of the particular
type of modification we want to implement. Consider:
r : a10⇒ b(20,pers) : 10@(1, trans) s : b30⇒ c(30,pers) : 15@(1, pers)
Since r is marked as transient, the rule can be used only in repos-
itory 1, while s can be used in all repositories after repository
1.Given a10@1 we can first derive +∂10 : 1 b(20,pers). Since b is
persistent we have +∂10@1 b20. The second rule cannot be appli-
cable, since its validity time is 15; to apply it we have to assume that
derivations are persistent within a repository. If this is the case then
we obtain +∂15 : 1 b20, which then makes rule s applicable, and
from which we get +∂15 : 1 c30. If we have that conclusions are
persistent across repositories, then we can conclude +∂15 : 2 c30.
Notice that we can conclude +∂15@2 c30 even if the reasons for
deriving it (i.e., rule r) do not persist across repositories.
3. NORM MODIFICATIONS IN TDL
We consider four kinds of modifications: substitution (which re-
places some textual components of a provision with other textual
components, or a provision with another provision), derogation (the
derogating provision limits the effects of the derogated provision),
annulment (which cancels ex tunc a provision and prevents it to
produce any normative effect), and abrogation (which cancels a
provision but does not cancel the effects that were obtained before
the modification). The application of a norm-modifying provision
changing a rule r is represented by deriving a set MOD of rules that
change the status, or even single parts, of r. This typically happens
via the application of one or more meta-rules that lead to obtain
the rules in MOD. In many cases (but derogation is an exception),
modifications imply that MOD should include a new version of r,
namely, that a rule, labelled by r, is in MOD but it is different from
the r which was in force before deriving MOD.
The following reasoning patterns correspond to the mentioned
types of modification.
Substitution
Preconditions: +∂ td@tr r : (A ↪→C) : tv;
Derived rules MOD: +∂ t ′d@t
′
r r : (A
′ ↪→C′) : t ′v;
Constraints: (1) A′ 6= A or C′ 6=C, and (2) t ′r ≥ tr and t ′v 6= tv, and
(3) −∆td@tr r : (A ↪→C) : tv.
Derogation
Preconditions: +∂ td@tr r : (A⇒C) : tv;
Derived rules MOD: +∂ t ′d@t
′
r r
′ : (A′ ⇒ C′) : t ′v, +∂ t ′d@t ′r r′′ :
(A′;∼C) : t ′v
Constraints: (1) A⊂ A′ and C′ 6=C, and (2) t ′r ≥ tr and t ′v 6= tv, and
(3) −∆td@tr r : (A⇒C) : tv.
Annulment and Abrogation
Preconditions: +∂ td@tr r : (A ↪→C) : tv;
Derived rules MOD: +∂ t ′d@t
′
r (r :⊥) : t ′v;
Constraints: (1) t ′r ≥ tr, t ′v 6= tv, and (2) −∆td@tr r : (A ↪→C) : tv.
The basic assumptions for all cases are that a modification can be
applied to r only if r is modifiable and it exists. The first assump-
tion is captured by the last constraint in each case. Let us consider
rule existence. Minimally, the existence of rule r is a notion relative
to repositories, thus the modification should take place in a subse-
quent or in the same temporal repository in which r exists. An
additional constraint, which has not been mentioned here, is that
the modification (i.e., typically, meta-rules) should be in force at a
time subsequent to the time when r is in force. This requirement,
which is adopted in many cases in legal systems, states in fact that
we cannot modify a normative provision which is not yet in force.
But this is not general necessary, as we can imagine a situation in
which a normative provision r is issued at t but will start to be in
force only from t +n. In the time span from t to t +n an authority
could change r even if it is not yet in force. Consider, for example,
a norm r issued in 2007 stating that 60 years people can no longer
retire. r will be in force in 2009, and then immediately applicable
and effective. Suppose that the new government deliberates in 2008
to remove r. This is indeed possible, even if r is not yet in force.
Substitution is the modification that changes, partially or entirely,
the antecedent or the consequent (or both) of a normative provision
r. Derogation can be applied only to defeasible rules: if applied
to r, it permits to introduce an exception r′ of r; in this case, the
derivation of the exception r′ is drawn together with inferring a
defeater r′′ that blocks the derivation of the direct effect of r when
r′ is applicable. Abrogation and annulment of r have basically the
same structure: what makes the former different from the latter is
the treatment of the effects of the modified rule. As we mentioned,
annulment cancels all effects of r, whereas abrogation does not.
Annulment is thus obtained by blocking persistency of derivations
across repositories. The conclusions of the annulled rule will only
be derived in the repository where the modification does not occur.
We have now to see when norm modifications can be in conflict.
Conflicting Modifications
annul(r : tv) : ta@t subst(r : tv) : t ′a@t ′
abrog(r : tv) : ta@t subst(r : tv) : t ′a@t ′
annul(r : tv) : ta@t derog(r : tv) : t ′a@t ′
abrog(r : tv) : ta@t derog(r : tv) : t ′a@t ′
subst(r : tv) : ta@t derog(r : tv) : t ′a@t ′
The previous table summarises the basic conflicts between the
norm modifications we have considered. To save space, we refer
to previous inference patterns when we need to specify rules r′ and
r′′ for derogation: r′ is the rule which corresponds to the exception
of r, while r′′ is the defeater that blocks the conclusion of r in the
exceptional case (see above). Notice that in all cases a conflict ob-
tains only if the conflicting modifications apply to the same time
instant and in the same repository, i.e., ta = t ′a and t = t ′. Annul-
ment and abrogation of r are incompatible with any substitution in r
(first two rows from top). A similar intuition holds for the two sub-
sequent rows: it is impossible to derogate to r if this rule is dropped
from the system. Finally, the cases in the last row from the bottom
state that a substitution in r is incompatible with a derogation if at
least one literal used in r′ or r′′ to derogate to r is replaced in r′ or
r′′, formally, A(r′ : t ′v)∩A(r : tv) 6=A(r : tv) or C(r′′ : t ′v) 6=∼C(r : tv).
4. CONCLUSIONS
We extended the logic of [5] to capture different temporal as-
pects of the norm-modification process. This extension increases
the expressive power of the logic and it allows us to represent meta-
norms describing norm-modifications by referring to a variety of
possible time-lines through which conclusions, rules and deriva-
tions can persist over time. We outlined the inferential mechanism
needed for the derivation of rules and literals. In particular, we
identified several temporal constraints that permit to allow for, or
block, persistency with respect to specific time-lines. This virtually
produces different variants of TDL according to whether a condi-
tion is adopted.
We described some issues related to norm modifications and ver-
sioning and we illustrated the techniques with some relevant mod-
ifications such as annulment, abrogation, substitution and deroga-
tion. In particular, we solved the problem of how legal effects of
ex-tunc modifications, such as annulment, can be blocked after the
modification applied. The idea we suggested is to block persistency
of derivations across repositories. In other words, the conclusions
of the annulled rule will only be derived in the repository in which
the modification does not occur.
The proposed methodology illustrates the possibilities of the for-
malism and we intend to apply it to the logical analysis of a larger
corpus of norm-modifications.
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